UCSC-SOE-13-14: On Assigning Implicit Reputation Scores in an Online Labor Marketplace

Maria Daltayanni, Luca de Alfaro, Panagiotis Papadimitriou, Panayiotis Tsaparas
11/01/2013 02:21 PM
Computer Science
In online labor marketplaces employers post job openings and re-
ceive applications by workers interested in them. The employers
decide which applicant to hire and then they work with the selected
worker to accomplish the job requirements. At the end of the con-
tract, an employer can provide his worker with some rating that
becomes visible in the online worker profile and can guide future
hiring decisions of other employers. In this paper, we discuss some
of the shortcomings of the existing reputation system and we pro-
pose a new reputation mechanism that combines employer implicit
feedback signals in a link-analysis-based approach. The new sys-
tem addresses the shortcomings of the existing one while yielding
similar or better signal for the worker quality.

UCSC-SOE-13-14